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SHOULD TIPPECANOE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V.
REYNOLDS BE OVERRULED?
GEORGE P. RYAN*
Is the relationship existing between a director' and a
shareholder of the same corporation such that if the director
purchases stock in the corporation from the shareholder, he
is not bound to disclose to the shareholder all the material
facts known to him officially which affect the value of the
stock? Does the director owe a different obligation to the
shareholder than a trustee does in dealing with his cestui
que trust? May the director deal with the shareholder as
with a stranger-free from the burden or duty of disclosure?
Is the rule the same where there is a prospective substantial
increase in the value of the stock, known to the director but
unknown to the shareholder, and shareholder has little if
any opportunity to ascertain the facts? If a director cannot
be considered as a trustee for the shareholder, is the director
under no duty of disclosure?
The Supreme Court of Indiana in Tippecanoe County
Commissioners v. Reynolds,2 decided in 1873, held that the
above questions must be answered in the affirmative. This
decision has never been overruled and presumably is the
law in Indiana to-day. In that case the defendant was a
director, officer and stockholder of a corporation in which
the plaintiff owned stock. The defendant, through a secret
agent, purchased the plaintiff's stock at a price which the
plaintiff considered fair in the light of the facts known to
it. The plaintiff believed that the corporation was heavily
burdened with debt, whereas, the corporation had sufficient
funds to pay off its debt. The defendant, by reason of his
official position, knew the true financial condition of the
corporation and the true value of the stock. The defendant
had reason to believe if the assets of the corporation were
sold, the value of each share of stock would greatly exceed
the share price paid the plaintiff. Subsequent to the pur-
chase of the plaintiff's stock, the defendant then being the
only shareholder, sold the corporation to a third party. The
Of the Indianapolis Bar.
In this article the word "director" is used to include also any execu-
tive officer of a corporation.
244 Ind. 509, 15 Am. Rep. 245 (1873).
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sale resulted in a handsome profit on the stock purchased
from the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought the action to re-
cover the difference between the price it received for its
stock and the price it would have received if it had been
paid the value of the stock measured by the price paid for
all the stock at the time the corporation was sold. On these
facts the court held that there was nothing in the case to
indicate that the purchase was infected with fraud or that
there was a violation of any special trust or confidence re-
posed in the defendant by the plaintiff. The court reviewed
a number of decisions which held that a director is not a
trustee for a shareholder and concluded that, since this was
true, the director was at liberty to deal with the shareholder
in the same manner as with a stranger. Chief Justice Downey
dissented on the ground that the defendant occupied a rela-
tion of trust and confidence toward the plaintiff.
Although there is a sharp conflict in the authorities,
the weight of authority is unquestionably in accord with
Tippecanoe County Commissioners 'v. Reynolds. This view
is based upon the proposition that a director of a corporation
is not a trustee for the individual shareholder and therefore
has the same right to buy stock from a shareholder as any
one else has. The rule laid down is that "while directors
occupy a trust relation to the corporation which they direct,
their duty does not apply to the stockholder in the sale and
purchase of stock. Dealing in its own stock is not a cor-
porate function. In buying or selling stock, directors may
trade like an outsider, provided they do not affirmatively
act or speak wrongfully, or intentionally conceal facts with
reference to it. There is also the qualification that no other
relation of trust exists between the parties."3 This is the
rule in Arizona 4 California, 5 Delaware, 6 Illinois7 Indiana,"
3 Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 879 (1915), L. R. A.
1916B 706.
4 Steinfeld v. Nielson, 15 Ariz. 424, 139 Pac. 879 (1914) (purchaser
of the stock, though not actually an officer or a director of the
corporation, was regarded as sustaining such a relation to th3
corporation and its stockholders since, as the majority stockholder,
he dominated its affairs through the board of directors).
S Bacon v. Soule, 19 Cal. App. 428, 126 Pac. 384 (1912).
6 Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (Ch. 1921), affd,
13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl. 1 (Ch. 1922).
7 Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912); Hooker v.
Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905) (director
offered to return shares at price paid, with interest).
8 Tippecanoe County Commissioners v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 15 Am.
Rep. 245 (1873).
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Kentucky, Louisiana, o Massachusetts," Michigan,12 Minne-
sota," Missouri,'- New Jersey,1" New York, 8 Pennsylvania, 7
Tennessee, 6 Utah, 9 Washington, 20 West Virginia,21 the fed-
eral courts, 22. England,'2 3 and Canada.2
4
This majority rule, for the most part, is based upon a
statement in Smith v. Hurd,2 5 decided by the Supreme Court
in Massachusetts in 1847. There a special action on the
case was brought by a stockholder in a bank against the
directors for nonfeasance and misfeasance of official duty.
The court held that the stockholder could not maintain the
action, and said: "There is no legal privity, relation, or im-
mediate connection, between the holders of shares in a bank,
in their individual capacity, on the one side, and the direc-
tors of the bank on ,the other. The directors are not bailees,
the factors, agents, or trustees of such individual stockhold-
ers." As applied to that case the above statement produced
the right conclusion and is, strictly speaking, correct. The
difficulty has arisen in applying this statement to a dif-
OWaller v. Hodge, 214 Ky. 705, 283 S. W. 1047 (1926); Barth v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 188 Ky. 788, 224 S. W. 351 (1920).
A0'I re Shreveport National Bank, 118 La. 664, 43 So. 270 (1907).
1 Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass. 401, 169 N. E. 268 (1929).
"2Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955 (1924); Walsh
v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 531, 90 N. W. 406 (1902).
18Rogers v. Prewry, 196 Minn. 16, 264 N. W. 225 (1935); Seitz v.
Frey, 152 Minn. 170, 188 N. W. 266 (1922); accord, Dutton v.
Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N. W. 414 (1925) (director and share-
holder held joint adventurers).
14Wann v. Scullin, 210 Mo. 429, 109 S. W. 688 (1908).
1 Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. L. 656, 23 Atl' 426 (1891); Connolly v.
Shannon, 105 N. J. Eq. 155, 147 AtL. 234 (Ch. 1929), 39 Yale
L. J. 582, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 530.
16 Carpenter v. Danforth, 19 Abb. Pr. 225, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868).
17 Krumbhaar v. Griffiths, 151 Pa. 223, 25 Atl. 64 (1892).
18 Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn 210, 177 S. W. 879 (1915), L. R. A.
1916B 706; Deaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tenn. 108 (1874).
lO White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921); Haarstick
v. Fox, 9 Utah 110, 33 Pac. 251 (1893).
20Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P. (2d) 373 (1931); Haver-
land v. Lane,-89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. 1118 (1916); O'Neile v.
Ternes, 32 Wash. 528, 73 Pac. 692 (1902).
21 Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S. E. 454 (1916).
2 Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 Fed. 98 (D. D. Del. 1917); Du Pont v.
Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1919) (directors formed syn-
dicate to purchase stock from shareholders). But ef. Strong v.
Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909).
23Percival v. Wright, L. R. 2 Ch. 421 (1902).
21 Allen v. Hyatt, 17 D. L. R. 7 (1914) (facts held to create fiduciary
relation).
INDIANA LAw JouRNAL
ferent set of facts, that is, to the situation where the direc-
tor purchased stock from the shareholder without disclosing
material facts affecting its value, and in reasoning from
the premise that the director is not a trustee for the indi-
vidual shareholder to the conclusion that the former does
not owe any duty under any circumstances to the latter.
In Blabon v. Hay, a case involving the purchase of stock
by two of the directors who, a year later, sold it for more
than twice the amount of the purchase price, Smith v. Hurd
was cited with approval and followed. The court said: "The
fact that the defendants were directors created no fiduciary
relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of
the sale of his stock. ' '26
The question was presented to the Massachusetts court
again in 1933 in Goodwin v. Agassiz.27 The directors had
purchased, through agents on the Boston Stock Exchange,
shares of stock in the company at a time when the directors
knew of, but had communicated to no one, a geologist's the-
ory as to the possible existence of copper deposits in the
region where the property of the company was located. The
exploratory operations were started in 1925 and completed
unsuccessfully in May, 1926. The geologist's theory was
formulated in March, 1926, and was known to defendants
shortly thereafter. The purchase of the stock in question
was made in May, 1926, immediately after plaintiff learned
that the exploratory operations had been terminated. The
court held, as it had in the case of Blabon v. Hay, that there
was no liability on the part of the directors for the reason
that the directors of a corporation do not occupy the position
of trustee toward the individual stockholders and that, in
this case, the plaintiff failed to prove actual fraud. The
court did, however, indicate that, in a proper case, it would
adopt the doctrine that special facts may create a fiduciary
relationship between the director and the individual stock-
holders. The court said: "While the general principle is as
stated, circumstances may exist requiring that transactions
between a director and a stockholder as to stock in the cor-
poration be set aside. The knowledge naturally in the pos-
22 12 Metc. 371, 46 Am. Dec. 690 (Mass. 1847).
26269 Mass. 401, 169 N. E. 268 (1929).
27 283 Mass 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933), 19 Corn. L. Q. 103, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 353, (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 678.
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session of a director as to the condition of a corporation
places upon him a peculiar obligation to observe every re-
quirement of fair dealing when directly buying or selling
its stock. M!re silence does not usually amount to a breach
of duty, but parties may stand in such relation to each other
that an equitable responsibility arises to communicate facts.
. . . Therefore, where a director personally seeks a stock-
holder for the purpose of buying his shares without making
disclosures of material facts within his peculiar knowledge
and not within the reach of the stockholder, the transaction
will be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted in ap-
propriate instances."
The court applied what it called "the general principle"
in Goodwin v. Agassiz because the stock was purchased on
the stock exchange and not directly from the individual
stockholder, and because the directors' knowledge was of
such a nebulous character that it did not raise the same ob-
ligation as knowledge of an established fact. The court de-
clared that, in some cases, "an equitable responsibility arises
to communicate facts." Any knowledge which the directors
have obtained by virtue of their position, nebulous or other-
wise, which would affect the value of the stock if known
to both parties, should create such an equitable responsibilty.
And, if so, it is difficult to understand how the fact that
the directors dealt through agents could alter in any way
the duty owed by the directors to the shareholder. It must be
noted, however, that the Massachusetts court is inclined to
abandon the old rule "in appropriate instances."
The Indiana court in Tippecanoe County Commissioners
v. Reynolds cited with approval the New York case of Car-
penter v. Danforth.28 In that case the court held that di-
rectors are not trustees of shareholders for the sale of the
stock of the corporation; that a certain trust relationship
exists but such relationship imposes upon the director only
the obligation with respect to the purchase of stock from
a shareholder, t6 refrain from actual, positive fraud. Con-
cerning the character of the relationship existing between
the parties, the court said: "There is, therefore, a certain
trust relation between the shareholders and the directors of
a corporation; but the trust put in the directors usually ex-
tends, and I must assume that in this case it extended, only
es 19 Abb. Pr. 225, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868).
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to the management of the general affairs of the corpora-
tion, with a view to dividends of profits; and, therefore,
that the trust relation between the defendant Danforth ex-
tended no farther. . . The plaintiff's stock was not the
subject of trust between them, nor had the trust relation
between them any connection with the plaintiff's stock, ex-
cept so far as the good or bad management of the general
affairs of a corporation by its directors indirectly affects
the value of the stock. ' '29 Applying the rule of this case to
the facts in Tippecanoe County Commissioners v. Reynolds,
the Indiana court arrived at the only possible conclusion.
In Von Au v. Magenheimer3o the question was presented
again to the New York court. In that case certain directors
"froze out" a shareholder by failure to declare dividends and
by raising their own salaries as officers, so that it would
appear that there would be no profits. The court said:
"While the wrong now being. considered was not technically
a deceit its effect was to defraud plaintiff, and, in respect
of the remedy at least should be treated as a fraud. It was
a species of fraud; by the wrongul acts of the defendants
the plaintiff was led to think that her stock was worth less
than in fact it was, and we should not indulge in hair-split-
ting discriminations between that kind of deceit and a fraud-
ulent misrepresentation or concealment respecting an exist-
ing fact, in view of the relations of the parties. If their
relation was not strictly of the fiduciary character of trus-
tee and cestui que trust, it was in a sense fiduciary; at least
the parties did not deal on equal terms; . . .The defendants
were not under the disabilities of trustees in respect of deal-
ing with a cestui que trust, but their superior position im-
posed upon them some duty to the plaintiff as well as to the
corporation, at least the duty not to take advantage of the
opportunity afforded by their position to wrong her by any
affirmative act designed to injure. Having power to so
manage the affairs of the corporation as to affect the value
of her shares, they owed her the duty to refrain from inten-
tionally abusing that power actually or apparently to depress
the value of those shares for the purpose of acquiring them
at an undervaluation. When they succeeded in securing her
29 Carpenter v. Danforth, 58 Barb. 581, 584 (N. Y. 1868).
So 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1908), aff'd, 196 N. Y.
510, 89 N. E. 1114 (1909).
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stock by that misuse of power they -committed a breach of
duty to her resulting in injury, and it is immaterial that
their act may also have wronged the corporation. In view
of the conditions under which business is now conducted it
will be very unfortunate if it shall be held that the duty of
corporate managers in respect of their conduct of the cor-
porate affairs is solely to the corporate entity, and that how-
ever great a designed injury to an individual stockholder
may be, he can only get redress through the corporation.
The purpose of the wrong being to injure the plaintiff that
should be held to have been its effect." The court thus rec-
ognizes the fact that the director is not, strictly speaking,
a trustee for either the corporation or the shareholder. The
relationship is characterized as "in a sense fiduciary." The
court points out, however, that the superior position of the
director prevents the parties from dealing on equal terms
and imposes on the director some duty to the shareholder as
well as to the corporation.31
Although Von Au v. Magenheimer appears not in ac-
cord with Carpenter v. Danforth, -the most recent New York
decision holds otherwise.32 The court referring to Von Au
v. Magenheimer said, "That decision makes plain that the
law will not permit a director to commit a deliberate active
fraud for the purpose of acquiring a stockholder's stock.
It does not, however, stand for one of the propositions now
contended for, namely, that the director, before he makes
the purchase must disclose to the stockholder all the informa-
tion he possesses. . . . The New York decisions, so far as
they touch the point, seem to be in accord. Carpenter v.
Danforth. . . . " But the court held for the defendant
directors on the ground that the plaintiff had not relied on
the directors in making the sale. The New York rule ap-
parently is that only under certain specific circumstances
does a director occupy more than a confidential relationship
to a particular stockholder, in no case is the director account-
able to the shareholder for the proceeds of his purchase
where the stockholder did not rely on the director in making
the sale.
31 19 Abb. Pr. 225, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868); Developments of the
Law-Corporations-I91; (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1374, 1389.
32259 App. Div. 176, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 328 (2d Dep't 1940).
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In Binns v. Copper Range Co. 38 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania refused, with qualifications, to recognize the ex-
istence of a fiduciary relationship between a shareholder and a
director. In that case the court said, "The general rule sup-
ported by the decided weight of authority and followed in
Pennsylvania holds that the mere fact that a purchaser of
shares from an individual shareholder is an officer or di-
rector of the company whose shares he purchases, does not
of itself in the absence of special circumstances create a
fiduciary relationship between them as to this sale of stock.
The duty of an officer or director is owed to the corporate
entity and not to the shareholder as an individual. '134
The minority view is followed in Georgia, 35 Iowa,20
Kansas,37 Nebraska, 38 and Wisconsin. 9  The decisions of the
courts in these states have, to a great extent, been based
upon the proposition that a director, with respect to the
individual shareholder, occupies the position of trustee.
Since the director does not hold the legal title to any prop-
erty to which the shareholder holds the equitable title, this
position cannot, in accordance with strict legal principles,
be justified. It seems apparent, however, that the real rea-
son behind this line of decisions is that the courts felt that
a rule which permitted a director to take advantage of his
knowledge of facts not known to the shareholder but with
which the ,director was familiar by reason of his official
position, was unreasonable, unfair, unconscionable, and of-
fensive to the moral sense.40
38335 Pa. 257, 6 A. (2d) 895 (1939).
s4 See also, Schuur v. Berry, 285 Mich. 654, 281 N. W. 393 (1938).
35 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903) (a leading case
on the minority view).
31 Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929
(1916) (contains an extensive review of the authorities).
37 Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. (2d) 531 (1932), (1933)
46 Harv. L. Rev. 847; Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac.
277 (1904).
38 Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N. W. 1041 (1916).
39 McMynn v. Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442, 201 N. W. 272
(1925), 10 Corn. L. Q. 509.
40 "The debate as to whether technically a fiduciary relation exists
may and doubtless will go on, but a knowledge of the law is not
required to enable one to appreciate the moral wrong perpetrated
by a corporate officer with knowledge acquired by virtue of his
position in profi:ng on the ignorance of a stockholder." Ladd J.,
in Dawspn v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 375, 157 N. W.
929, 933 (1916).
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In Oliver v. Oliver4 the Supreme -Court of Georgia held
that the director is a quasi trustee for the shareholder and
based its conclusion, that the director was under a duty to
disclose material facts affecting the value of the stock, upon
that foundation. In discussing the relationship existing be-
tween the shareholder and the director the court said: "No
process of reasoning and no amount of argument can destroy
the fact that the director is, in a most important and legiti-
mate sense, ,trustee for the stockholder .. . Not a strict
trustee, since he does not hold title to the shares; not even a
strict trustee who is practically prohibited from dealing with
his cestui que trust; but a quasi trustee as to the sharehold-
er's interest in the shares. If the market or contract price
of the stock should be different from the book value, he
would be under no legal obligation to call special attention
to that fact, for the stockholder is entitled to examine the
books, and this source of information, at least theoretically,
is equally accessible to both. It might be that the director
was in possession of information which his duty to the com-
pany required him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not
disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation
to the company overrides that to an individual holder of the
stock. But if the fact so known to the director cannot be
published, it does not follow that he may use it to his own
advantage, and to the disadvantage of one whom he also
represents."
This question reached the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Strong v. Repide.42 In overruling a
decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands 4
the court said: "If it were conceded that the ordinary rela-
tion between directors and shareholders is not of such a
fiduciary nature as to make it the duty of the director to
disclose to the shareholder general knowledge which he pos-
sesses, yet there are cases where by reason of the special
facts such duty does exist." In the instant case the court
found the following special facts to exist: (1) defendant
was a director; (2) owned three-fourths of the stock; (3)
was administrator general with large powers; (4) was
engaged in negotiations which finally led to the sale of the
41118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903).
42213 U. S. 419, (1909).
43 Strong v. Repide, 5 Off, Gaz. P. I. 72 (1907).
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land at a price which very greatly enhanced the value of
the stock; (5) was the chief negotiator for the sale of all the
lands and no one knew as well as he the exact condition
of such negotiations; (6) was acting substantially as the
agent of the shareholders by reason of his ownership of
shares and by acquiescence of other shareholders; (7) the
negotiations were for the sale of the whole property; and
(8) the lands were the only valuable asset owned by the
company. The court said these special facts make "such a
combination as rendered it the plain duty of the defendant
to speak." The court did not review or discuss the author-
ities upon any of the propositions involved but cited two
cases" as illustrations of "where by reason of special facts,"
a duty of disclosure exists, and one case, Tippecanoe County
Commissioners v. Reynolds, supra, illustrating the general
rule that there is no such duty. The court relying on the
particular facts of the case did not express a definite opinion
as to whether the director-shareholder relation was fiduciary.
It seems probable that the court would have arrived at the
same conclusion in any case where the director had failed
to disclose facts which affected the value of the stock and it
is quite apparent that if the existence of such special facts
as were enumerated by the court in this case were established
as the test of the duty to give information and if such test
were applied to the facts in the case of Tippecanoe County
Commissioners v. Reynolds that the decision of the Indiana
court would be held erroneous.
It has been urged that to place the burden of disclosure
upon the director would deprive him of the same valuable
right to purchase shares of stock in the open market that
other shareholders have, and would thereby reduce the mar-
ket for shares or would require constant information to be
given to ,the shareholder whenever the director wished to
enter the market.45  This argument is fallacious. If the
director need not disclose information, then the stockholder
cannot participate equally in the market for the director
will always have an unfair advantage over the shareholder.
Likewise, under the majority rule the director can appropri-
ate to himself business opportunities which should belong
44 Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904); Oliver v. Oliver,
118 Ga. 862, 45 S. E. 232 (1903).
45 Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director, (1923) 32 Yale
L. J. 637, 640.
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to all the shareholders equally and to which the director
should have no special claim. Indeed, the rule tends to keep
investors out of the market and to depress the value of
shares more than a rule which gives equal opportunities to
directors and shareholders alike.
In support of the majority rule, it is argued that the
shareholder has access to the books of the corporation and
that if he fails to examine them he has only himself to
blame. Theoretically this is sound but, as a matter of prac-
tice, leaves the shareholder without information. The books
of many of the large modern corporations are, from a prac-
tical standpoint, geographically inaccessible to a great num-
ber of the shareholders. Furthermore, an inspection to be
of any practical value to the shareholder would require the
services of highly trained, not to mention highly paid, ac-
countants.
The supposed difficulty of supplying information to the
shareholder is non-existent. There are well known channels
whereby such information can easily and quickly be sent to
all shareholders. 8 It appears, therefore, that, from an eco-
nomic standpoint, the advantages are all in favor of the
minority rule and against the rule laid down in Tippecanoe
County Commissioners v. Reynolds.
The rule announced by the Supreme Court of Iowa in
1937 in Humphrey v. Baron 7 seems to be the most desirable
rule. There the court said: "Where an officer or director
of a corporation proposes to purchase stock from an indi-
vidual stockholder, such officer or director occupies a fidu-
ciary capacity towards the stockholder with whom he is
dealing, and is in duty bound to disclose evidence bearing
upon the value of the stock coming to his knowledge as an
officer or director of the company."
It is not necessary for the courts to identify the rela-
tionship as trustee-cestui que trust, principal-agent, or any
other fiduciary relationship recognized by prior decisions.
It should be sufficient to recognize the fact that the director
does occupy a special position with respect to the individual
shareholder whenever the director deals in stock of the cor-
poration. The directors are placed in office by the votes
46 Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors' Purchases of Stock (1927)
25 Mich. L. Rev. 827.
47 223 Iowa 735, 273 N. W. 856 (1937).
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of the shareholders and the shareholder should have the
right to expect that the director for whom he casts his vote
will not only manage the affairs of the corporation to the
best of his ability but will also deal fairly and openly with
the individual whose vote has helped to place him in office.
If the relationship is designated as fiduciary, the problem
is simplified. It is familiar law that one acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity shall not be permitted to make use of that
relationship to benefit his own personal interest.
The realities of modern business practices makes the
conclusion inescapable that Tippecanoe County Commisssoners
v. Reynolds should be overruled.
